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Executive Summary
The communists’ electoral victory and the elevation of Voronin to the Presidency
drew Moldova closer to the Russian Federation and raised new questions about
the stability of the Dniester Moldovan Republic.
The existence of the DMR no longer serves Russian interests as it did in the past.
The prospects for confrontation between the DMR and Moldova are greater
today as a result of the Communist Party victory.
President Voronin is willing to accept the existence of the DMR.
By the latter part of the past decade, the DMR existed primarily as a vehicle for
criminal activities rather than as a bastion of Stalinism and Russian nationalism.
Weapons left behind by Soviet forces have made the DMR a major factor in
illegal arms trafficking.
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The Presence of Russian Federation Troops in Eastern Moldova
The Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence on the August 27, 1991
following the disintegratio n of the USSR. At that time, there were about 30,000
Soviet soldiers in 36 military garrisons on the territory of the Moldovan Soviet
Socialist Republic. Most of the units belonged to the 14th Army. These troops
found themselves in a legal void. Meanwhile, separatist insurgencies in
Transdniestria and Gagauzia and the massive arrival in Moldova of Russian
mercenaries (most notably, Don Cossacks) made the creation of the Republic of
Moldova National Army and the clarification of the legal status of former Soviet
military units an urgent matter. 1
On November 14, 1991, the equipment of the former Soviet military units in the
Republic of Moldova was declared property of the state (Decree No. 234 of the
President of the Republic of Moldova). On March 18, 1992, the President of the
Republic of Moldova issued a decree assuming jurisdiction over military
formations located in Moldova. These measures served as a legal basis for the
creation of the National Army, but provoked a negative reaction in Moscow. As a
result, on March 20, 1992 the Government of the Republic of Moldova and the
General Staff of the United Army Forces of the CIS signed an agreement
regarding the status of military forces of the former USSR located in Moldova.
According to this treaty, about 150 military units in Moldova were to pass under
the authority of the Ministry of Defense of the Republic of Moldova. Another 50
units, considered strategic by the Russians, would remain under CIS control. The
units of the CIS were scheduled to withdraw from the territory of the Republic of
Moldova by January 1, 1993.
The situation in the localities in eastern Moldova became very serious, however.
The units of the 14th Army were in an extremely tense atmosphere. Separatists
were already destroying the state structures of the Republic of Moldova. Stores
of weapons and ammunition were assaulted by crowds searching for weapons
for separatist forces. As a consequence, it was common for officers of the 14th
Army to formally pass to the reserves, then immediately receive jobs at the
plants from the Industrial Military Complex of the former USSR. At the same
time they became members of the Labor Detachments of Collaboration with the
militia, the Territorial Emergency Detachments and the Dniestrean National
Guard. The amorphous structures of the CIS could not control the situation.
Consequently, on April 1, 1992, President Boris Yeltsin issued a decree regarding
Russian military units which, in effect, invalidated the CIS-Moldova Agreement.
1

Gagauzia is in southern Moldova. The Gagauz people are Christians of Turkish extraction. They make up
about 3.5% of the population of Moldova (including Transdniestria).
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Open intervention of the 14th Army on the side of the separatists began
immediately after the Republic of Moldova proclaimed its independence. In
September 1991, the commander of the 14th Army, General Iakovlev, accepted
an appointment as President of the Supreme Council of Defense of the Dniester
Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic. An open transfer of armament to the
paramilitary formations of separatists and mercenaries took place. In Spring
1992, separatist troops also obtained heavy armament such as tanks and artillery
(including Grad multiple rocket launchers) from the 14th Army. There were
cases when entire units passed under the authority of the DMR. The 14th Army
openly intervened in the conflict on the side of the separatist regime in spring–
summer 1992, ensuring its salvation.
By the end of 2000, there were no Russian troops west of the Dniester and 14th
Army had been reduced to about 2,800 soldiers (mostly native to the region) and
renamed the Operative Group of Troops. The unit consisted of the 8th Motorized
Infantry Brigade with an attached tank battalion and transport helicopter
squadron. Its armament includes 119 tanks, 129 armored fighting vehicles, 129
artillery pieces, 36 anti-tank launchers and 7 helicopters.
Ammunition stores are another problem. Most Russian materiel in Moldova is
kept at the village of Colbasna. The ammunition stocks in Colbasna were created
for the needs of the 14th Army. However, when the evacuation of the Soviet
troops from the eastern European states began, Colbasna’s ammunition holdings
expanded considerably. In 1991, the stores’ commandant reported 45,951 tons of
ammunition on hand. However, in 1994, within the framework of the
negotiations regarding military equipment on the territory of the Republic of
Moldova, the Russian military reported only 24,266 tons. This discrepancy has
raised suspicions that ammunition has passed to the paramilitary formations of
the DMR. On October 21, 1994, the Russian Federation and the Republic of
Moldova signed an agreement that stipulated that Russian troops should be
evacuated in three years.2 Alerted by that agreement, the separatist leader Igor
Smirnov issued a decree that banned the evacuation of the ammunition from the
territory of the DMR and declared it the property of the “Transdniestria people.”
In 1994, the stores at Colbasna were divided into two parts, one of which is
controlled and guarded by the DMR (the 3rd Motorized Infantry Battalion from
Rybnitsa). 3 Since there is a frontier post at the stores’ exit, manned by troops
from the State Security Ministry of the DMR, the separatist regime controls the
removal of armament from both sections of the stores.

2

The Russian Duma has not ratified this treaty. In November of 1995, the Duma passed a resolution
declaring Transdniestr a zone of strategic Russian interests.
3
This battalion has about 350 soldiers and is equipped with armored personnel carriers, a battery of multiple
rocket launchers, a battery of six MT-12 anti-tank guns, and an anti-aircraft battery of ZU-23-2s.
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The acceptance in 1996 of the Russian Federation into the Council of Europe was
conditioned on the withdrawal of Russian Federation troops from Moldova. On
the eve of the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE)
summit in Istanbul in November 1999, the Russian Federation evacuated three
trains loaded with auxiliary equipment as a symbolic gesture, but the Russian
Federation still maintains a military presence in Transdniestria. The Russian
Federation blames separatist leaders for their failure to complete the evacuation.
On June 17, 2000, a Russian representative in Vienna presented the schedule of
evacuation for the ammunition, but claimed that the schedule could be followed
only with the cooperation of the separatist leaders.
At present, the situation regarding the evacuation of troops and ammunition
remains unclear. On the eve of the meeting of the OSCE Ministers of External
Affairs from Vienna on November 27, 2000, Russia made another symbolic
gesture, removing 50 wagons of auxiliary equipment. On November 23, the
DMR’s president, minister of state security, and minister of external affairs were
invited to Moscow by the Secretary of the Security Council of the Russian
Federation to discuss the evacuation schedule. When they came back to Tiraspol,
the separatist leaders presented this step as part of “the Agreement Protocol on
Military and Property Issues,” signed by Russian Prime Minister Victor
Chernomyrdin and the Transdniestrian separatist leader, Igor Smirnov on March
20, 1998 at Odessa. This protocol, signed with the tacit agreement of the Republic
of Moldova, stipulates the separation of the materiel into three categories:
-

Materiel of the Operative Group of Troops;
Materiel that must be unconditionally evacuated to the territory of the
Russian Federation;
Materiel that can be sold (The proceeds to be divided in proportion of 50%
to 50% between the Russian Federation and the DMR).

The destiny of the Russian military presence in Transdniestria will depend
largely on the evolution of the political situation within the Republic of Moldova.
The Russian Federation actively influenced the political situation in the Republic
when Petru Lucinschi was President by enlisting the support of the Moldovan
Communist Party, the Russian language press and Russian secret services. The
desired goal was to bring to governance, through the democratic process, proMoscow political forces. Such a development would, they believed, facilitate a
Moldovan merger with the Russia-Belarus Union, Russian military bases in
Moldova and the establishment of Russian as the official second language of the
state. This, in turn, could encourage pro-Russian sentiment s in the Ukraine. The
communist victory in the 2001 elections indicated that this strategy as a sound
one.
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Historical Background
On March 27, 1918, after the disintegration of the Russian Empire, most of what
is now the Republic of Moldova became part of Romania. The slice of Moldova
east of the Dniester remained part of Russia. In 1924, it became the Moldovan
Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (MASSR). In 1940, the USSR annexed the
rest of Moldova. In August 1994, combining the recently annexed territory with
the MASSR, Soviet authorities created the Moldovan Soviet Socialist Republic
(MSSR). The Soviets created an anti-Romanian phobia to avoid questions from
the local population about the legality of annexation of 1940 and formation of the
MSSR. In schools, the period between 1918 and 1940 (when western Moldova
was part of Romania) was presented as “the period of Romanian -Fascist
occupation.” From the very first days after the annexation, the Soviet regime
attacked entire social groups. Teachers, priests, former officials and farmers
(especially those who opposed forced collectivization) were all assaulted.
Repeated forced deportations to Kazakhstan and Siberia took place from 1941 to
1949. Forced collectivization and a terrible drought in 1947 resulted in a famine
in which at least 200,000 people died of malnutrition. Though there was no food,
the Communist regime prohibited the free movement of the local population to
other areas from the USSR. The official historiography addressed the famine only
after the collapse of the USSR.
Meanwhile, attacks were directed against the population’s historical memory
and culture. Churches were destroyed. Subscription to the Romanian press was
prohibited (only in the MSSR, not in the other Soviet republics) as was the sale of
literature published in Romania. With the replacement of the Latin alphabet with
Cyrillic, the Romanian spoken by the local population was now called
“Moldovan.” The fiction that Moldovan was a language rather than a dialect was
pushed to the extent that Moldovan KGB officers received a bonus of 15% of
their salary for foreign language (Romanian) aptitude. Simultaneously, the idea
that the Moldovan nation had no connection to Romania was insistently
imposed.
From 1940, the Soviets changed the ethnic composition of the population of
Moldova. Despite the fact that the population density of the MSSR was the
highest in the USSR (127 persons/square km), there was an influx of Russians.
These new arrivals did not know the language of the local population or the
history of this territory and the majority of them were citizens of the USSR.
Meanwhile, Moldovans were sent to other Soviet republics under various
programs (mobilization to forced work, etc.).
The ethnic composition of Transdniestria is more russified than that of western
Moldova. Many of the Russian immigrants had been factory workers who had
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been sent to work in the more industrialized Transdniestria region. In addition,
retired soldiers, most of whom were Russians, often settled in Tiraspol and
Bender.4 In western Moldova, 69.5% of the population is Moldovan or Romanian
and 20.5% is Russian or Ukrainian. In Transdniestria, 58% is Russian or
Ukrainian (In Tiraspol more than 80% of the population is of Slav origin.) and
40% are Moldovan or Romanian. In Transdniestria, the concentration of Soviet
troops was much higher than in western Moldova.
The conflict started with disputes over national languages. In 1989, in the MSSR,
the “Moldovan” language was declared as the state language (recognizing,
however, that it is essentially the same as Romanian), though the Latin alphabet
was re-imposed. Transdniestrian separatists insisted on keeping the Cyrillic
alphabet. By and large, the Moldovan government did not press the issue, but in
many places Moldovan zealots fired or demoted citizens who did not speak the
language. 5
The political confrontations on linguistic issues were accompanied by conflicts
over Moldova’s status. The Moldovan Popular Front rode a call for national
independence to overwhelming victory in the 1990 parliamentary elections. Once
independence was declared, however, the Popular Front called for reunification
with Romania. This caused unrest in the industrial centers of Transdniestria.
Transdniestria had never been part of Romania until 1941–1944 when Romania
(allied with Nazi Germany) controlled this territory. The cruel realities of the
wartime occupation did not engender a positive image of Romania in the eyes of
the Transdniestrian population. 6
Shortly after the Language Act, the United Council of Work Collectives (OSTK)
was formed in Tiraspol. The OSTK’s stated goal was to combat Romanian
nationalism in Moldova. In the 1990 parliamentary elections, the OSTK won most
of the seats from the Transdniestria region, while the Moldovan Popular Front
won an overwhelming majority of the seats from the rest of the country. The
delegates from Transdniestria soon left Chisinau, however, citing threats and
violence by Popular Front supporters. Two weeks after the Gagauzian
declaration of autonomy on August 19, 1990, Transdniestrians created their own
republic (September 2, 1990). Almost immediately, there were violent encounters
4

Bender is located on the western side of the Dniestr. Because it is directly across the Dniestr from Tiraspol
and is essentially Tiraspol’s “sister city,” it was occupied by the DMR. It is the only city in western Moldova
occupied by the DMR.
5
Later, in 1993, there would be similar persecution in the DMR. Teachers and officials opposed to the
continued use of Cyrillic were demoted or fired.
6
The population of the rest of Moldova turned out to be no more enthusiastic. In a referendum in March
1994, 95% of the population voted to remain independent. The Popular Front, by ignoring overwhelming
public opposition to reunification went from a position of dominance in Moldovan politics to one of
irrelevance. By then, however, relations between DMR leaders and the government of the Republic were
beyond repair.
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between separatists and government forces. Since, this conflict was taking place
in an area still under Soviet authority, there was no out-and-out warfare between
the factions.
That changed in August 1991. Following the failed coup in Moscow (a coup
supported by some DMR leaders), Chisinau declared Moldovan independence.
In September, agents from Chisinau kidnapped Igor Smirnov, the OSTK’s leader,
from the Ukraine. After a separatist blockade of the railway running from
Moldova to the Ukraine (through Transdniestria) caused economic disruption in
Moldova, Smirnov was released. In December, shortly after his release, Smirnov
was elected president of the DMR with 65% of the vote. By spring of 1992, armed
clashes between Republican and DMR forces were commonplace.
From the beginning of the conflict, Transdniestrian separatists used violence
against their opponents. Armed “guardians” inspected villages opposed to
separatism and intimidated the population. Job dismissals, intimidation, even
murder of active opponents of separatism, led to an exodus to the western side of
the Dniester (about 25 thousand persons before the outbreak of open warfare). 7
As a result, the Republic of Moldova lost its grip on the eastern region and open
opponents of separatism within the DMR became increasingly isolated, and
therefore guarded in their actions and utterances.

7

On December 8, 1991, general elections were held in Moldova. The mayor of the village of Caragas on the
eastern side of the Dniestr, organized an event for a presidential candidate. Later, he was found dead in a
well.
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Russian Involvement in Moldova
Russian Federation experts categorically deny that Russia has supported
separatism and claim that Russia has involved herself in this conflict because it
was necessary and no other country would. However, the content of the first
document signed by the Russian Federation as peacekeeper in Transdniestria
supports allegations of interventionism. That document was signed in Moscow
on July 21, 1992 by the presidents of the Republic of Moldova and the Russian
Federation. The document created a security zone administered by a Unified
Control Commission (UCC), which included members from the Republic of
Moldova, the Russian Federation and the DMR. The agreement allowed
separatist leaders to maintain the full control over the eastern region of the
Republic of Moldova and to be protected by peacekeeping forces of the Russian
Federation. 8 Understandably, this protection has made the leadership of the
DMR less willing to compromise than it would be without such protection. The
creation of the state structures of Transdniestria continued under the cover of the
14th Army and with political, military, economic and informational support from
the Russian Federation. Formally, this process ended with the adoption through
referendum of the constitution of the DMR on December 24, 1995.
The Russian mass media has strongly endorsed the positions of the separatists in
Transdniestria. As a result, the Russian public has come to view the Republic of
Moldova as an aggressor and Transdniestria as a defender of the Russophone
population’s rights.
There is clearly a pro-DMR lobby in the State Duma of the Russian Federation.
The Duma has not yet ratified the treaties between Moldova and Russia signed
by both parties in 1990 and 1993. The Duma has repeatedly taken provocative
stances regarding Transdniestria. There have been proposals for bilateral treaties
between Russia and the DMR. The DMR has been visited many times by Duma
deputies. The Duma has created a “Commission for Contribution to Settlement
of Political and Economic Situation in Transdniestria.” Every time elections take
place in Transdniestria (illegal from the point of view of the Republic of
Moldova) Russian deputies assist as “international observers” and declare them
“free and democratic” despite the protests from the Republic of Moldova. The
Russian Federation insists that representatives of the DMR participate in the
negotiation of the treaty on friendship and collaboration between the Russian
Federation and the Republic of Moldova.

8

On July 2, 1992, forces of the Republic of Moldova attempted to recapture Bender. The offensive was called
off when Russian tanks stationed in Tiraspol moved into Bender.
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The stability of the DMR stems largely from the fact that the regime serves
Russian interests. The education system in Transdniestria is based on Russian
standards. Transdniestrian children study from Russian books. Studies at the
State University in Tiraspol are based on Russian standards and the University of
Tiraspol is part of the Russian Association of Universities. The Russian Orthodox
Church is also actively supporting the separatist regime.
All the leaders of the DMR are citizens of the Russian Federation and travel to
different states with Russian foreign passports. Moscow sends these leaders on
missions. Some of them were included on the election lists of the liberals of
Zhirinovski and of the “Stalinist Block for the USSR” at the last elections in the
Duma of the Russian Federation. Tiraspol encourages inhabitants of
Transdniestria to adopt Russian citizenship. About 65,000 persons have already
become citizens of the Russian Federation. We can suppose that this push to
increase the proportion of Russian citizens in Transdniestri a is aimed at
providing a pretext for future Russian interference in the internal affairs of
Moldova.
There is a consular section of the Russian Embassy in Tiraspol. Though the
Russian Federation does not officially recognize the DMR, the presence of this
consular section lends the regime credibility. On November 2, 2000, the consular
section signed an agreement with the Edinstvo (Unity) movement regarding the
procedure to obtain citizenship and foreign passports. The pro-Russian Edinstvo
movement came to prominence after the implosion of the Popular Front. The
evolution of Edinstvo and its support from the Russian Federation suggest that
this may be an attempt to implement a “Costunica” scenario, with a controversial
leader (Smirnov) replaced by more attractive leaders (Edinstvo). The Republic of
Moldova would thus lose one of its major arguments (freeing the DMR’s
population from dictatorship) for regaining sovereignty over this territory.
Understandably, Igor Smirnov and his companions had an extremely negative
reaction to this development because they fear that the Russian Federation could
stake its future on Edinstvo and they could be shunted aside.
The Russian Federation also supports the DMR by providing orders for its
products. There is also industrial cooperation. Grad multiple rocket launchers are
assembled at Transdniestrian plants using parts produced at Russian plants. The
Itera company, which is affiliated with Gazprom from Russia, has privatized the
metallurgical plant in Rybnitsa (a city in northern Transdniestria), which
provides about 60% of the budget of the DMR (This privatization was made in
the absence of an adequate legal framework, yet Chisinau was silent.). In
addition, during the last ten years the Russian Federation has delivered natural
gas to Transdniestria. The DMR’s debts for gas already exceed $500 million, but
the Russian Federation continues to accept token payments of goods in lieu of
cash.
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Perhaps not every action by Russians in Moldova has been sanctioned by
Moscow. Undoubtedly, there were renegade actions. In 1989–1992 the USSR and
the Russian Federation experienced the kind of political chaos that makes such
actions possible. However, many official Russian acts have benefited the
separatists. Government actions are driven largely by self-interest, and it is
undeniably in the best interests of the Russian Federation is to transform the
Republic of Moldova into an unofficial protectorate of the Russian Federation.
Such an outcome could serve as a lever of influence on the Ukraine and
Romania. In addition, key decision makers in the Russian Federation still regard
Transdniestria as the key to Balkans. Some Russian military experts believe that
the withdrawal of the Russian troops from Transdniestria would considerably
reduce the military potential of Russian bases in the Crimea.
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Transdniestrian Smuggling and Chisinau
When the Republic of Moldova lost the control over Transdniestria, this
separatist region became a hub of illegal enterprises. The fact that DMR
authorities have access to an official Republic of Moldova customs stamp
facilitates such activities. 9 The most important of these is the smuggling of
excised goods – alcohol, tobacco, and oil. Smugglers take products through the
section of the frontier that is controlled by the DMR (The DMR controls the
entire eastern frontier with the Ukraine.). The smugglers declare that the
products are going to be transited through Transdniestria. They therefore do not
pay any customs duties or excise taxes. In fact, many of them never arrive on the
left side of the Dniester River and another part is distributed in many countries.
About 60% of the oil products brought on the territory of Moldova is smuggled.
Transdniestria has also become a center of a criminal international network that
deals in smuggled cigarettes. This business is monopolized by the Sherif firm
that is protected by the DMR’s Ministry of State Security. The official import per
capita of the excised goods, only through the customs that are controlled by the
Republic of Moldova, is about 20 times greater in Transdniestria than in
Moldova. In fact, Igor Smirnov has named his son President of the State Customs
Committee. The annual volume of illegal transactions that were performed only
through the section of the frontier that is controlled by the Republic of Moldova
exceeds the sum of $500 million.
Illegal arms sales are another income source for the DMR. For example, it is
known that seven Grad multiple rocket launchers, which were produced at the
Pribor plant in Bender, reached Abkhazian separatists in Georgia. Additional
weapons from the DMR arsenals were shipped to the Middle East as well as
Central Asia. While current and former Moldovan officials are reluctant to speak
openly, persistent rumors place these weapons in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In
1999, Moldovan police arrested a group of DMR soldiers for illegal sale of arms
and munitions (plastic explosives and detonators, thermobaric projectile
launchers and Stinger anti-aircraft missiles). The group was led by Colonel
Nemkov who is the deputy commander of the local Russian peacekeeping forces.
Nemkov and his group were apprehended by Moldovan authorities in Bender, a
city that lies on the dividing line between the DMR and the Republic of Moldova.
On the same day, Colonel Nemkov’s son, an officer in the DMR Ministry of
Security, and two military associates, were stopped driving a Moskvitch sedan
which was towing a trailer. The trailer contained three Igla ground to air rockets
and military telescopes designed for sniper rifles. While Nemkov was convicted
in a Chisinau court for trading in illegal weapons, he received a pardon and was
9

Interview with the Honorable John Stewart, US Ambassador to Moldova, Chisinau, 22 May 1997.
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immediately released. Upon his return to Tiraspol, he was allowed to resume his
position as deputy commander of the Russian peacekeeping forces.
Armament from the DMR was also sold to Chechnya. In March 2000, Russian
secret services arrested Igor Smirnov’s son who had $1–200,000, believed to be
the proceeds of armament sold to Chechens. In Summer 2000, false U.S. bank
notes, which allegedly were paid by Chechens for armament, circulated in the
DMR. When Vladimir Putin visited Chisinau in June 2000 he was shown an
automatic grenade launcher that was produced in Transdniestria and used
against the Russian Army in Chechnya. The Moldovan Ministry of Interior
brought two of the grenade launchers to show as part of an exhibit intended to
demonstrate that Tiraspol factories are producing materials for Chechens to use
in combat against the Russian Army. The exhibit supported a consistent
Moldovan theme that Smirnov and his associates are criminals deserving no
official Russian support.
Unfortunately, there is no reliable data about the volume of arms trafficking.
And, while there has been extensive media speculation, it is impossible to
determine the precise routes used by arms traffickers. One possible avenue for
illegal arms shipments is the Tiraspol military aerodrome. Many Moldovan
police officials believe this airfield is used for the illegal air transport of military
armament. They suspect that the weapons are transported by railroad from
Odessa to Iliicevsk. A criminal group composed of former Afghanistan fighters
controls this port and it is used for transportation of armament by sea.
The free hand given Transdniestrian smugglers stems from the unilateral
yielding of the Republic of Moldova. On February 7, 1996, authorities from
Moldova and Tiraspol signed the “Protocol Decision Regarding the Customs
Services of the Republic of Moldova and Transdniestria.” The first two articles of
this document required the disbanding of the customs services that were created
by the DMR along the Dniester River and the creation of a common customs
service along the frontier with the Ukraine. Article 3 of this document required
the Republic Moldova to deliver a customs stamp with the inscription: “The
Republic of Moldova. Customs Tiraspol” to Transdniestria. In ten days, the DMR
obtained the customs stamp, but has yet to fulfill the first two conditions.
Authorities in Moldova have thus given the separatist regime the ability to
legalize the circulation of smuggled goods and to do business outside Moldova
as economic agents of the Republic of Moldova. There is no evidence that these
economic agents pay anything to the budget of Moldova.
Such concessi ons by the Republic of Moldova allow the separatist regime to
survive economically, maintain an army of comparable size to the Moldovan
Army, and operate a repressive state machinery. Chisinau’s passivity towards
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Transdniestrian separatism might be excused, since, after the military conflict
stopped, Moldovan popular interest toward this problem rapidly waned. In fact,
there is even limited support for the separatist regime, cultivated by Russian
language newspapers in the Republic of Moldova. One such paper, Komersant
Moldovy, is financed by a state agency in Tiraspol.
Chisinau’s generosity towards Transdniestrian separatism is more troubling. It is
possible that such generosity by politicians in Chisinau toward the DMR is the
fruit of payments to politicians or political campaigns by separatists or criminals.
The DMR has had friends in high places in Chisinau, particularly politicians who
came into politics from pro-Moscow political parties. For example, Vladimir
Solonari was elected to Parliament in 1990 from Edinstvo, which was defending
the idea of saving the USSR. Immediately after the disintegration of the USSR,
Solonari, who was a deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova,
became active in the structures of DMR and contributed to the consolidation of
the Transdniestrian state system. He then came back to Chisinau to serve as a
deputy from 1994 to 1998. The case of Serghei Gradinari is another example.
Gradinari was a deputy in the Parliament of the Republic of Moldova from 1994
to 1998. Immediately after that, Smirnov appointed him Minister of Finance in
the DMR government. This position could be a payoff for his support of
Transdniestrian interests in previous years.
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Repression in the DMR
Much of the DMR’s stability can be attributed to the regime’s repression of the
Transdniestrian population. The DMR’s constitution proclaimed that the DMR
was “a democratic, sovereign, independent, legal state.” The document contains
no reference to the Republic of Moldova and prohibits (Article 8) activity aimed
against the sovereignty of the Republic. This provision has allowed leaders from
Tiraspol to take repressive measures against opponents of separatism. The
Ministry of State Security persecutes attempts by Transdniestrian residents to
participate in the politics of the Republic of Moldova. 10 The Helsinki Committee
for the Human Rights of the Republic of Moldova revealed that officials from the
Ministry of State Security in Tiraspol have arrested the citizens from western
Moldova for engaging in political activity in Transdniestria. The same ministry
hinders every attempt to organize international human rights organizations.
On September 30, 1994, Igor Smirnov issued Decree No. 222 regarding
“protection of the population from gangsterism and from other manifestations of
the organized crime.” According to this decree, every suspicious person can be
held in preventive detention for 30 days. Independent lawyers, such as Chisinau
attorney Vyatcheslav Turcanu, have access to data on torture at the detention
centers and have spoken freely about conditions in DMR facilities. In
Transdniestria, the citizens do not have the right to defend their rights in court
because the judiciary is state-controlled in the Soviet style.
The Ministry of State Security has become an instrument of election fraud. For
example, V. Osadciuk, the president of the Tiraspol Election Commission, a body
which, in December, 2000, was created for elections to the Supreme Soviet of the
DMR, is a colonel from this ministry. His initial appointment and his subsequent
behavior have demonstrated the crucial role of the DMR police in securing
predictable election results. Even before creation of the Election Commission, the
police presence at elections was significant and the role of the police in
“electioneering” was remarkable even by post-Soviet standards. Not only did the
Ministry count the ballots, it also helped get out the vote on election day.
Though inhabitants of Transdniestria have access to Moldovan broadcasts and
publications, the DMR’s print and broadcast media is strictly censored. The
population is regularly intimidated with the “danger of unification with
Romania.” The Republic of Moldova is portrayed as an aggressor in 1992 and as
10

In 1994, DMR authorities formally forbade voting in the Moldovan parliamentary elections. In the 1998
elections, there was no formal stricture, but voting was aggressively discouraged, and only about 3,000
Transdniestrians voted.
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a possible aggressor in the future. This biased media has fanned the fires of
separatism.

Relations with the Ukraine and Romania
Separatist leaders have cultivated relations with the Ukraine. Because the
Ukraine shares a border with the DMR, the Republic of Moldova cannot organize
an economic blockade of separatist region without the Ukraine’s cooperation. In
addition, the DMR benefits from a tremendous volume of smuggled goods
passing through this frontier to and from the seaports of Odessa (to the
detriment of the economies of the Ukraine and Moldova). Frontier guards are
generally corrupt and consequently the frontier between the Ukraine and the
DMR is porous. Finally, the Ukraine is important as a fallback ally in case Russia
ever loses interest in Transdniestria.
About a quarter of the population of the DMR is of Ukrainian extraction.
Vladimir Bodnar, a separatist leader from Tiraspol, is also president of the
Association of Ukrainians from Transdniestria. He frequently meets with
Ukrainian leaders including the President Leonid Kuchma. During a discussion
with representatives of the Government of the Republic of Moldova, Mr.
Kuchma declared that the Ukraine would not support any economic blockade of
the separatist region because it is populated by so many Ukrainians. Tiraspol has
signed bilateral agreements of cooperation with the administrations of Odessa
and Vinitsa in the Ukraine. These agreements could not have been concluded
without the blessing of Kiev. The Ukraine is encouraging the expansion in of
Ukrainian language education in the DMR by providing teaching materials and
offering scholarships to Ukrainian universities for graduates of Transdniestrian
schools. Following the example of the Russian Federation, the Ukraine
encourages Transdniestrians to obtain Ukrainian citizenship. However, at
present, the number of Ukrainian citizens in the DMR is only 2–3,000. Perhaps
this is being done with an eye toward claiming historical Ukrainian rights over
Transdniestria if the Republic of Moldova is forced to officially concede the loss
of Transdni estria.
According to provisions of a memorandum regarding regulation of the
Transdniestrian conflict signed on May 8, 1997 in Moscow, the Ukraine, as well
as Russia, has the status of “state-guarantor.” In mid-1998 Ukrainian forces
joined Russian, Moldovan and Transdniestrian troops in the security zone.
There are no official relations between Tiraspol and Bucharest. The separatist
regime continues to pursue an anti-Romanian campaign. The campaign has two
basic themes, one based on history and another based on recent events. The
historical theme draws on the experiences of Moldova in the inter-war years
when “Greater Romania” included most of what is now the Moldovan Republic
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and during World War Two itself. During these years, DMR officials maintain,
Romanian police conducted a campaign of repression against Moldovan
residents on the West bank of the Dniester River and also made routine
incursions onto the Eastern bank in what was at that time part of the Soviet
Union. It was only through the intervention of the Russians, they insist, that the
people of this region were spared the brutality of virtual occupation by the
Nazis.
Recent events, according to DMR authorities, have witnessed a Romanian return
to the practices of the 1940s. As evidence, they cite alleged Romanian military
support for the Moldovan forces during the 1992 war. In particular, they charge,
Romanian pilots played an active combat role. Their military service was
augmented by a steady flow Romanian military hardware across the Prut River
into Chisinau. DMR spokesmen charge that Romanian military “adventurism” is
now being replaced by a strident form of “Romanian nationalism” that aims at
the “destruction” of the non-Romanian communities on the eastern bank of the
Dniester.
Relations between Transdniestria and Romania are limited to the exchange of
goods by private economic agents. This traffic is rather limited and there are few
Romanian commercial goods on sale in Tiraspol and the surrounding
communities. More significant in economic terms is the fact that Transdniestria
imports oil from Romania. As a producer of petroleum products, Romania is one
of the few regional suppliers for essential energy resources. The uncertainty of
the DMR economy and the attendant difficulties in assuring prompt payment,
however, inhibit the expansion of this trade. The Rybnitsa Metallurgical Plant is
also involved in trading with Romania since a major part of the metal it produces
starts out as scrap metal from Romania.
In the spring of 1992 four countries – Russia, Romania, the Ukraine and Moldova
– were involved in attempt to settle the Transdniestrian conflict, which, by then,
had claimed about a thousand lives. Representatives met in Chisinau, 6–17 April
1992. Romania, which was represented by Prime Minister Adrian Nastase, was
the only country that supported Moldova in accordance with international law.
Unfortunately, a major battle broke out in Bender on June 18, 1992, causing the
failure of the initiative. There is suspicion in Moldova that Russian secret
services, wishing to eliminate Romania from the settlement of the Transdniestria
conflict, were behind the outbreak. Certainly, the incident worked to Russia’s
advantage. Since then, though the OSCE has become involved in negotiations,
Russia has been in the driver’s seat with regard to mediating the conflict.
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Relations with Gagauzia
In the interests of keeping Moldova within the Russian orbit, Moscow has aided
separatists not only in Transdniestria but in Gagauzia as well. On September 26,
1990 elections in the Supreme Soviet of the so-called “Autonomous Soviet
Socialist Gagauz Republic within the USSR” were planned to take place. Mircea
Druc, prime minister of Moldova, tried to stop those elections by force and sent
several thousand “volunteers” to Gagauzia. That action intensified the
opposition of Gagauz people towards Chisinau. In 1994, the Parliament of the
Republic of Moldova granted autonomy to Gagauzia, but that has not solved the
problem. Radical leaders from Gagauzia continued to accuse the authorities from
Chisinau of aggravating the social-economic situation.
Relations between Tiraspol and Comrat (the capital of Gagauzia) have been
friendly. In 1990, while Mircea Druc’s “volunteers” attempted to stop the Gagauz
elections, the Unified Council of Work Staffs from the DMR sent dozens of buses
full of armed “guardians” to support the Gagauz separatists. 11 Tiraspol has also
offered Gagauzia electricity produced by the thermal-electric station in
Cuciurgan. Significantly, even during such times of economic austerity in the
DMR, Tiraspol’s officials arranged to sell the electricity to Gagauzia at a price
well below the market value. In 1999, elections for the Popular Assembly (a
legislative body with 35 deputies) took place in Gagauzia. The extremist wing
led by Mihail Kendighelean was the big electoral winner. On July 5, 2000 in
Tiraspol, Grigore Marakutsa, president of Supreme Soviet of the DMR, received
the delegation of Popular Assembly of Gagauzia. The delegation was led by
Michael Kendiglian , one of Comrat’s most hardline officials. As part of that visit,
an agreement of collaboration was signed. In that agreement, Gagauzia
recognized the legality of DMR. This document states that the coordination of
efforts between Tiraspol and Comrat are aimed at creating a common front for
weakening the central authority of Chisinau. Since then, the Popular Assembly of
Gagauzia has frequently demanded that Gagauzia should be involved in
negotiations regarding the organization of a common state. 12

Relations with Moldova
The DMR’s official position toward the Republic of Moldova is uncompromising
–the DMR and the Republic of Moldova are two sovereign states with equal
rights that, in accordance with the Memorandum of May 8, 1997, could create a
common state. Unification is clearly not Tiraspol’s preference, however. On July
13, 2000 at Chisinau, Igor Smirnov was supposed to sign the “Agreement
11

The USSR also sent troops. It was the arrival of troops from the Interior Ministry that caused the armed
“volunteers” to return to Chisinau. This intervention is a major reason for Gagauzian warmth toward Russia.
12
July 2,2000 in Tiraspol, Gagauz Yeri opened a “consular office” headed by Ivan Burgudji.
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Regarding Application of Popular Diplomacy in Order to Reestablish Faith
Between the Population from Both Sides of Dniester River.” After previously
promising to sign this document, Smirnov has now categorically refused to sign
it.
Before the 2001 elections in which the Communists regained political power in
Moldova, the Moldovan Communist Party developed closer ties with their
ideological allies in Tiraspol. Communists from Transdniestria participated at
Communist meetings in Chisinau and routinely maintained close contacts with
Party officials there. Yet, as long as Petru Lucinschi was President of Moldova,
those developments had no impact on relations between Chisinau and Tiraspol.
Relations between Communists in Chisinau and those in Comrat have also been
friendly. On the eve of anticipated elections for the Parliament of the Republic of
Moldova, Communist leader Vladimir Voronin signed an agreement with 25
deputies from the Popular Assembly of Gagauzia. The deputies pledged
Gagauzian support for the Communist Party and Voronin promised to consider
the possibility of Moldova’s joining the Russia-Belorussia union. They also
promised that they would proclaim Russian as the official language of
Moldova. 13
However, Communist support for the hard-line faction in Gagauzia, at least in
the past, has not translated into electoral success. This was illustrated by the 1999
election for chief executive (Bashkan) of Gagauzia, in which Dumitru Croitor,
easily won election in spite of being opposed by the Communist Party. Croitor is
not as radical in his actions and declarations as Kendighelean, but his stance
toward Chisinau is not very different.
Communists in the Republic of Moldova fared better than their comrades in
Gagauzia. As a result of the parliamentary elections of February 25, 2001, the
Communists won and Voronin became president. 14 This has raised fears that the
Republic of Moldova may reunite with the DMR as a Communist state.

13

Most Gagauzians speak Russian.
The Republic of Moldova has a modified proportional representation system. It is designed to weigh in
favor of major parties to avoid the kind of multi-party chaos that is often present in pure proportional
representation systems. As a result, though the Communists only received 50.2% of the popular vote, they
received 70.3% of the parliamentary seats.
14
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NEW LEADERSHIP AND OLD ISSUES
Reasons for the Communist Victory
The victory of the Moldovan Communist Party (CP) during the parliamentary
elections on February 25, 2001 had a dramatic impact on the Moldovan Republic
and the stability of the DMR. This was the most attention focused on this region
since the armed conflicts of 1992. The fact that the communist return to power
came within the context of the democratization of the RM gave analysts great
cause for concern.
While the victory of the communists may have come as a surprise to casual
Western observers, local analysts had long predicted victory for Voronin’s party.
The dimensions of that victory, however, were a surprise even to the communists
themselves. Under Moldovan electoral law, the popular results gave them 71 out
of 101 seats in the new Parliament.
The success of the communists may be attributed to several causes. The first and
most obvious reason was expressed by the CP leader Vladimir Voronin in the
immediate post-electoral period. At that time he stated that “the result of the
elections represents not only the victory of the CP”, but an overwhelming
rejection of the current government and its policies.
After Moldova declared its independence in 1991, the RM gained Western
support as a result of its important geopolitical position. Consequently, Moldova
began its reforms with significant Western encouragement and was soon
recognized as a leader in the post-Soviet reform process. The small nation was
routinely cited by Western authorities as being a leader of the reform process in
the former USSR. Meanwhile, the notion of “reform” was accepted by the local
population as the proper solution for Moldova’s problems. Unfortunately, the
process of transforming the economy into a market system didn’t bring benefits
for most people. In fact, the standard of living for the average citizen declined
during this period. A poor economic environment was coupled with political
instability, endless and bitter power struggles, and instability in the political
leadership.
A second important factor in the communist victory was the astute political
agenda established for the electoral campaign: the liberalization of prices, the
reestablishment of order, social guarantees, participation in the RussianBelarusian Union, and having Russian as the second official state language. All
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of these nostalgic promises were addressed to people who felt neglected during
the ten post-communist years: the rural population, Russian speakers who
resented demands that they should learn Romanian and workers who suffered
from non-payment of wages.
A third reason for the communist victory was the ineffectiveness of other
electoral competitors. The center-right political parties seemed concerned
primarily with their internal relationships and failed to establish a favorable
popular image in contrast to that of the communists. Had the center-right parties
established a unified front, they would have won approximately the same
number of votes as the communists. Throughout most of the year prior to the
elections, the center-right leaders focused their greatest hostility on each other
rather than on their communist rivals.
Being unable to establish their own credibility as a governing force, the
representatives of the center-right parties simply maintained that the communist
party wasn’t ready to govern. The communists, they insisted, would fail just as
and the Moldovan Agrarian Democratic party failed when in controlled the
government. Petru Bogatu, writing in an editorial in Tara, predicted that a
communist victory would bring two results:
1) The Moldovan situation would become even worse than before and the
government would once again lose popular confidence.
2) Moldova’s fledgling democratic system, built over the last decade, would
collapse and take the economy down with it. 15
Reactions to the Communist Victory
The Romanian political elite, now under the leadership of former communist Ion
Illiescu, was alarmed by the success of the Moldovan communists. One of
Romania’s leading journals declared that “Moldova has tragically and needlessly
surrendered in front of the red tide”. Yet, as it made this statement, the editorial
suggested that Romania shares responsibility for this development because it
failed to establish solid relations with its neighbor across the Prut. 16
The Russian reaction, if one looks beyond official statements, reflects an element
of ambivalence. While the Russian mass media was often effusive in its reactions
to the elections, many analysts in Moscow, speaking unofficially, expressed both
realism and reservations. Some expressed their concern that Moldova, if drawn
considerably closer to the Russian Federation, might constitute a burden to the
15
16

Tara, 19 January 2001
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already burdened Russian-Belarusian Union. Moldova, they observe, is the
poorest country in Europe and the development of its national economy has been
very slow, even by CIS standards. Moreover, such analysts maintain, Moscow’s
relationship with the United States may well be further complicated should the
impression emerge that Russia is attempting to assimilate Moldova. 17
The official reaction of the DMR concerning the election results was rather
cautious. In his first statement, DMR President Igor Smirnov insisted that “the
leadership of DMR is waiting to see if Voronin’s electoral promises are translated
into reality.” 18
Independent observers in Tiraspol noted that the communist victory was not, in
fact, welcomed by Tiraspol’s leaders because they felt embarras sed by the
dramatic power shift in Chisinau after so many years of denouncing Moldova as
the main threat to its security. Even more important was their suspicion that
Moscow would clearly prefer Voronin to Smirnov in any Moldovan
confrontation. Tiraspol’s role as a “bridgehead of Russian interests” in Moldova
was shattered and the value —in Moscow— of the Tiraspol leadership was
seriously degraded. According to unofficial observers, Tiraspol’s leadership fell
into a state of panic in the aftermath of the February elections.
The new environment prompted Smirnov to take what might be regarded as
emergency actions to respond to this new “threat” to the DMR’s stability. Nongovernmental organizations in Transdniestria, which, for the most part, are
manipulated by the government, were quickly mobilized to counter any popular
ambivalence about Tiraspol’s relations with Chisinau. All NGO leaders
suspected of weakness in the face of the new challenge were removed. Their
replacements came from the ranks of the most hardline among the DMR
leadership. Meanwhile, security forces were called upon to be even more vigilant
and increasingly alert to any threats posed based in the Moldovan Republic. 19
In April, the Moldovan Parliament finally approved a new government headed
by Vasile Tarlev with Vladimir Voronin as President. The ceremony of
investiture took place at a session of the Parliament and the Constitutional Court.
Deputies and members of the Constitutional Court, ambassadors accredited in
Chisinau, members of Government, hierarchical representatives of the Orthodox
Church, representatives of the local Parliament in Gagauzia led by Mihai
Kendighelean, participated in the ceremony. Significantly, representatives of the
DMR Supreme Soviet didn’t attend the ceremony, even though Grigorii

17

Interviews conducted the Moscow staff of the William R. Nelson Institute, March, 2001
Evening News, ProTV, Chisinau, 28 February 2001
19
Interview with Serghei Kirlak, Chisinau, 13 March 2001
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Maracuta (the president of the DMR Supreme Soviet) initially indicated that he
planned to attend.
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Impact on the Stability of the DMR
The new Moldovan leadership declared during the political campaign that one of
the main priorities of a communist administration would be the solution of the
Transdniestrian conflict. After the elections, William Hill, the OSCE
representative in Moldova, stated that should Chisinau and Tiraspol adopt
constructive positions, negotiations concerning the Transdniestrian conflict could
be successfully completed by determining the juridical status of the region.
“There is no reason, at least not a reasonable one, for delaying negotiations. The
existing obstacles have been only artificial ones”. President Voronin has opposed
what he refers to as “excessive internationalization “ of the Transdniestrian
problem and against negotiations in Bratislava or Vienna. It is the “parties who
are in conflict who should find a solution”, not foreign diplomats. 20
The communist electoral success alarmed those elements of the DMR leadership
who fear that their stability is undermined by the type of negotiations suggested
above. Even more detrimental to the DMR’s stability is Voronin’s support for
Moldovan membership in the Russian Belarus union. Obviously, the Russian
Federation would oppose a separatist regime in Moldova and the utility of the
DMR government would vanish.
“Olvia-press” in Tiraspol immediately
broadcast an interview with Valeriu Litkai, “the grey eminence” of the DMR who
heads the DMR Ministry of Foreign Affairs. According to Litkai, Tiraspol will not
allow its relationship with Chisinau to be determined exclusively by the prospect
of Moldovan membership in the Russian-Belarus Union. 21
Following Voronin’s assumption of the presidency there were three events that
demonstrated that Voronin’s election would quickly determine the fate of the
DRM. The first was on 9 April 2001, when Vladimir Voronin, in one of his first
acts as president, met with DMR President Igor Smirnov. On 16-17 April,
Voronin visited the Russian Federation where he discussed, among other things,
relations with the DMR. On 18-19 April, Moldova has been already visited by
Evghenii Primakov, the Head of the State Comission of the Russian Federation,
visited Moldova in order to “discuss and clarify” the Transnistrean situation.
The most significant of these events was the meeting on 9 April, which was
initiated by President Voronin who viewed the meeting as a means of
stimulating the negotiation process. Voronin and Smirnov were joined by several
key officials: Vasile Sturza, the president of the State Committee for Solving the
Transdniestrian conflict within the Government in Chisinau, William Hill, the
OSCE representative in Moldova, Petro Cialii, the Ukrainian Ambassador to
Moldova, and Aleksandr Novojilo, the representative of the Russian Presidency
20
21
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in the process of negotiation between Chisinau and Tiraspol. As the meeting
began, Vasile Sturza, stressing a positive and optimistic attitude in Chisinau,
declared Moldovan support for creating a new strategy for solving the
Transnistrean conflict within the context of broader international participation in
the forthcoming Bratislava meetings. Sturza’s optimism was not immediately
rewarded and Igor Smirnov continued to display what most observers regarded
as an inflexible attitude. 22
At the conclusion of the meeting, the Chisinau-Tiraspol dialogue continued to be
based on certain fundamental assumptions. First, the Moldovan Republic and the
DMR represent two single subjects, equal in rights, and who maintain their
sovereignty and legitimacy. The words “harmonization of customs and fiscal
legislation…”, noted in the concluding documents, acknowledge this position.
Second, DMR authorities enjoy the same legitimacy as Moldovan officials.
Voronin, by signing the conference document, committed Moldova to cancel the
“customs and fiscal prohibitions of Moldova at the border of Transdniestria”,
thus acknowledging Smirnov’s authority over “the state frontier” while making
no reference to the border with the Ukraine. The word “conflict” does not appear
in the document. 23
Vladimir Voronin’s visit the Russian Federation followed within only a few days.
In fact, it came even before the Moldovan Parliament had selected the leaders of
the new government. Yet, the results of the meetings are significant for the
stability of the DMR. Voronin participated in a series of meetings with officials
from the Russian Federation, including the leadership of “Gazprom”. The latter
meeting was especially significant in securing basic Moldovan energy needs but
also represented the willingness of the Russian leadership to alleviate one of the
key vulnerability of the Moldovan Republic. In taking such a step, Russia clearly
identifies itself with Chisinau after many years of maintaining a more reserved
position.
Official Russian skepticism about Transdniestrian claims of “legality” were
underlined by Evghenii Primakov during his two days in Chisinau. Sources on
the Moldovan governmen tal commission for solving the Transdniestrian
problem indicate that Primakov came to Chisinau to meet specialist groups from
Chisinau and Tiraspol and to discuss with them a new project for determining
the status of Transdniestria. The new project was developed by the Ukraine,
Russia and the OSCE, with participation of Chisinau and Tiraspol. The project is
generally referred to as the “Primakov project” and, in its initial form, called for
the federalization of Moldova, a condition long rejected by Moldovan authorities.
During his visit, Primakov also stated that the problem of evacuation the Russian
22
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Federation's troops from Moldova's territory was not a Russian priority. Such a
position represents a rejection of a long-held Moldovan demand for a
withdrawa l of these forces.
On April 19, Primakov visited Tiraspol. His time in the DMR began with a
private meeting with Igor Smirnov, followed by a briefing for journalists and
meeting with the "deputies of the legislative Committee" of DMR. Within the
framework of these meetings, Primakov announced the "small steps" policy in
solving the Transdniestrian problem and he underlined the necessity for all
parties to renounce extreme solutions. Smirnov, in his concluding remarks to
journalists, declared that Russian President Vladimir Putin has created "two
separate committees" for economic collaboration between the Russian Federation
and Moldova, one for Chisinau and one for Tiraspol. This action, he insisted,
proves that Russia endorses the notion of two Moldovan states. 24
During these diplomatic exchanges, Voronin took an important action calculated
to strengthen his position among opposition factions in Moldova while further
undermining Smirnov’s position. On 12 April, mass media in Chisinau
broadcast Vladimir Voronin's letter addressed to Smirnov and asking Igor
Smirnov to "pardon" Ilie Ilascu and the other members of the so-called Ilascu
group as a humanitarian gesture during Easter. While the other members of his
group remained in prison, Ilie Ilascu was set free on 5 May 2001 and transferred
by Tiraspol's security to special services in Chisinau. Upon arriving in Chisinau,
Ilascu first asked to meet President Voronin whom he thanked for heaving
obtained his release. The President affirmed that the meeting with Ilascu took
place around 11 o'clock and that Ilascu was "in a pretty good mood and
cheerful".
Romanian President Ion Iliescu reacted enthusiastically to news of Ilascu’s
release, describing it “as a very important political moment" and the result of a
political evolution and international pressure. Illiescu described this action as an
important indication of promise for a political resolution of the Transdniestrian
conflict, which remains a "delicate problem, a sensitive one "for the Moldovan
stability for its integration and for the territory. 25 Adrian Severin, the president of
the Parliamentary Administration of the OSCE, echoed President Illiescu by
agreeing that this act provided hope for a more rational and constructive
approach of the Transdniestrian crisis. 26
On 13 April, the Belarus Ambassador to Moldova, Vasile Socovici, accompanied
by other officials of the Byelorussian Embassy, visited Tiraspol. Officials in
24
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Tiraspol used this meeting to consolidate economic relations between the DMR
and Belarus. They also gave the Ambassador a set of documents purporting to be
the results of the referendum in Transdniestria on the question of having the
DMR join the Russia Belarus Union as a separate member. The results, they
explained to the Ambassador, indicated great enthusiasm on the part of all the
residents of the DMR. 27
On 1 May 2001, Voronin made an official visit to Romania during which he
participated in the ecological summit of the Carpathian -Danubian countries,
which took place in Bucharest. During his stay, Voronin met President Iliescu
and they called for pragmatism in Romanian -Moldovan relations, underlining
the necessity of economic cooperation. Among the most important issues
discussed by the two presidents were: creation of business centers in the capitals
of both states, construction of railroads with European gauge tracks, sustaining
Moldovan efforts for adherence to the South Eastern European Stability Pact and
other international organizations, and greater use of Romanian financial support
for privatisation of energy, transport, and agricultural companies in Moldova.
The tone of the new Moldovan foreign policy became clear by when Voronin, at
the invitation of his Ukrainian counterpart, Leonid Kuchma, announced an
official visit to Kiev. With this recognition of the importance of the Ukraine to the
Moldovan agenda, Voronin has indicated that relations with Moscow, Bucharest
and Kiev are Moldova’s first concerns. Byelorussia is also considered important
and Voronin quickly indicated his intention to visit this nation in the first days of
his administration.

Summary: Voronin as a Factor on the Stability of the DMR
Vladimir Voronin, in his first actions as President, has indicated the following:
He is willing to accept Igor Smirnov as a legitimate leader;
He sees the DMR as a genuine state and is willing to recognize the DMR’s
sovereignty.
He is willing to forgo the internationalization of the Transdniestrian dispute and
will allow the Russian Federation to control resolution of this problem with
Moldova and thereby guarantee Moldova’s territorial integrity.
He is apparently willing to accept a Russian military presence in Moldova.
The position of the officials of the Russian Federation can be expressed in the
following assumptions:
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The Russian Federation, even after the communist success in Moldova, seems
reluctant to pressure Transdniestrian leaders. The Russian Federation apparently
has no interest in reestablishment of the territorial integrity of Moldovan
Republic.
As a means of solving the Transdniestrian conflict, the Russian Federation
intends to create a “guarantee” mechanism, through which it may direct the
internal political processes in Moldova and maintain Moldova under its
unofficial protection. This goal can be achieved by imposing the internal
organization of a “common state”, thus allowing Russia to control Moldova’s
behavior. The Primakov Memorandum of May 1997 is a first step toward this
goal.
In spite of the fears of the DMR leadership, the Russian Federation is likely to
continue to promote at least some elements of the separatist regime in
Transdniestria. Should the DMR completely disintegrate, Moscow loses its status
as “guarantor” of Moldova’s security. Moldovan membership in the RussianBelarus Union is not likely to change this.
The Russian Federation’s role in Moldova will be irreversibly legalized should
the new government facilitate the privatization of key Moldovan industries by
means of Russian economic agencies, especially those controlled by Russian
criminal organizations. Russian “generosity” in supplying the DMR with natural
gas at no charge for almost a decade indicates how such control may be
developed. 28
In summary, it is important to recognize that while Voronin’s election to the
Presidency represents a threat to the DMR’s stability, the new administration is
not inclined to exploit Tiraspol’s vulnerability. The key item on Voronin’s agenda
is strengthening the domestic situation of the Moldovan Republic and direct
confrontations with the DMR will not advance that goal. The greatest threat to
the DMR, therefore, is posed not by Chisinau’s actions during this time but by
Tiraspol’s reactions to a perceived threat. The DMR’s refusal to allow Voronin to
travel to Tiraspol to visit his elderly mother shortly after his assumption of the
Presidency is an indication that local authorities may well be reverting to the
attitudes and action of the past decade. Should Smirnov and his associates begin
to operate on the basis of a paranoid fear of being undermined by a more
attractive Moldovan alternative, they will prove themselves to have been their
own worst enemies. The consequences of such an over-reaction are likely to be
tragic and raise the real possibility of a return to the violence of the first postSoviet years.
28
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APPENDIX
The Opposition View: Trading Sovereignty for Illusory Integrity
On May 16, 2001, President Voronin met in Tiraspol with his “counterpart,”
Igor Smirnov. There was great interest for this event especially as several days
earlier, on May 12, Vladimir Voronin had been denied entry to DMR territory
where he wanted to visit the Noul Neamt monastery (in Chitcani, on the right
Dniester bank, officially in the security zone).
In Tiraspol Vladimir Voronin signed five documents (“Protocols” or
“Agreemen ts”). They comply with the Joint Declaration of the leaders of the
Moldovan Republic and DMR signed on April 9th in Chisinau and with the
Memorandum regarding the normalization of the relations between the
Republic of Moldova and DMR (Moscow, May 8th 1997). Essentially, these
documents refer to bilateral documents regulating the relations between two
subjects of international law after the end of the armed conflict between the
two states.
The most important of these documents is arguably the “Protocol regarding
the mutual recognition of the documents issued by DMR and the Republic of
Moldova.” By signing this document, Voronin has acknowledged the right of
the separatist regime in Tiraspol to issue the whole range of official documents
granted by a sovereign state to its citizens. This together with Voronin’s
commitment to recognize the documents issued and authenticated by notary
public offices, show that the Moldovan President has abandoned both the
population in the areas controlled by Igor Smirnov and all the assets of the
Moldovan state in Transdniestria. It is also apparent that this Protocol
facilitates the international recognition of the DMR, as Article 2 reads “The
parties will inform foreign states and international organizations about the
document s coordinated by the two parties.” The Republic of Moldova will
grant freedom of commercial activities to all companies from Transdniestria
outside of Moldova, just like in the case of the customs stamp, which
Moldovan officials gave to DRM customs officials several years ago. In the
meantime, the inhabitants of the separatist area, especially those who for over
ten years have regarded themselves as citizens of the Republic of Moldova, are
left to the mercy of a hostile regime.
Article 4 regarding foreign investments and cooperation in the investment
field univocally and explicitly admits the existence of two different territories,
the Republic of Moldova and DMR (“The parties will address the diplomatic,
consular and economic representatives on the territories of the Republic of
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Moldova and of the Dniester Moldovan Republic asking them to use the
stipulations of the this Protocol in their activities as citizens and economic
representatives of their own countries”). This implies that there is already an
understanding between Vladimir Voronin and Igor Smirnov regarding the
boundaries between the two territories. It is the same kind of agreement that
Hitler and Stalin had back in August 1939 when they drew their own frontiers
on the political map of Europe.
The Protocol concluded after the meeting of the leaders of the Republic of
Moldova and DMR has an article stipulating that the Government of the
Republic of Moldova must devise a plan to pay the Moldovan state debts to
DMR. It is obvious that such a relationship can only exist between two states.
The most important article in the Protocol regards paying damages to DMR
for the armed conflict from 1992. The very presence of such an article in a
documents signed by the Moldovan President is a sign that Vladimir Voronin
is on a par with Igor Smirnov when approaching the tragic events of 1992. Igor
Smirnov, however, never forgets to reiterate that in 1992 the Republic of
Moldova committed an act of aggression against the “Transdniestrian
people.” Therefore, all the Moldovan citizens who fought for the territorial
integrity of the Republic of Moldova, including those who died in the 1992
events, will be labeled as “aggressors” in the near future.
The documents signed on May 16 in Tiraspol, as well as various events or
statements related to the Transdniestrian conflict (such as the participation of
the Minister of Defense of the Republic of Moldova in the meeting of the CIS
Defense Ministers’ Council in Baku, May 18 2001, for example), allow us to
make some predictions about the evolution of the events in the near future.
The intensity of the events related to the Transdniestrian problem comes from
the fact that in November 1999 at the OSCE summit in Istanbul the Russian
Federation made a commitment to withdraw its ammunition and armament
from the territory of the Republic of Moldova by 2001. Unwilling to carry out
its promise, the Russian Federation needed a Moldovan leadership that would
legalize its military presence in Moldova. To this end, the Communist Party
prevented the election of the President by the former Parliament and had a
decisive contribution to the dissolution of the Parliament and the early
elections on February 25. Before the February 2001 elections, a detailed
scenario regarding the fate of Moldova and Transdniestria was developed;
this scenario started to be put into practice immediately after Vladimir
Voronin was inaugurated as President on April 7, 2001. The rough outlines of
this scenario are as follows:
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Under the pretext of solving the Transdniestrian conflict, the Republic of
Moldova will soon become a confederation with two (Chisinau, Tiraspol) or
even three (if we include Comrat) subjects with equal rights. This
confederation will be accepted at the earliest possible date as a member of the
Russia-Belarus Union. Immediately after the meeting on the 16th of May at
Tiraspol, the Russian Federation Duma has started the preparations to create a
legal frame and a favorable public opinion in order to achieve this goal.
The agreements reached between Chisinau and Tiraspol will be enforced
through a mechanism of “warranties” soon to be released. This mechanism
will confirm Moscow’s mediating role in the Chisinau -Tiraspol relations.
Russian military presence on the territory of the Moldovan Republic will be
one of these “warranties.”. At the same time, the admission of the newly
formed Confederation in the Russia-Belarus Union will legitimate the
establishment of Russian military bases in Moldova.
The incident on May 12, when president Vladimir Voronin was denied access
to the Noul Neamt monastery by the Transdniestrians is part of the same
scenario. The public was thus led to believe that president Voronin tried to
intervene but the “evil” Igor Smirnov didn’t let him. Thus the responsibility
was lifted from Voronin and at the same time the Russians continue the
process of taking complete control over the Moldovan Patriarchy using
Justinian.
In the near future the communist MP’s will initiate a procedure to alter the
Constitution of the Republic of Moldova and during that process it will
became clearer what kind of Confederation Moldova is going to be a part of
according to this scenario. At the same time both the head of the state and the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs will do everything to persuade Europe on
Moldova’s intentions of becoming part of the EU (the Europeans are so naïve
as to believe the statements of the politicians in the ex-Soviet countries).
Another problem is to ensure that the Republic of Moldova, once a part of the
Belarus-Russia Union, can no longer leave the Union even if the leadership
changes. Kremlin has already gone through the painful experience of the
collapse of the former USSR and understands this is the most difficult
problem. To solve it, they will modify the core structure of the state bodies of
the Republic of Moldova (a bicameral Parliament, with a consolidated
presence of the DMR and Gagauz Yeri MP’s, etc.) Russian capital will be used
to privatize the strategic areas of the “Confederation’s” “national economy”
and the investments will be directed toward DMR industry, to make sure that
the living standards of the population on the left bank of the Dniester are
higher than those of the population on the right bank. Moldovan citizens and

2001

31

especially DMR citizens will be even more persistently encouraged to adopt
Russian citizenship. The formal end of hostilities will naturally allow the
Russian Federation to open consulates in DMR. At the same time, since they
are components of the “common state,” DMR and Gagauz Yeri will have a
high degree of independence that will allow Russia to formally recognize
them as independent states in case the situation on the right bank of the
Dniester goes out of control.
It’s obvious that this scenario is not the only possible one. Of particular
interest is Igor Smirnov’s situation. Some analysts think that Vladimir
Voronin, by making bigger concessions (compromises) than his predecessors,
is trying to catch Voronin off-guard at the presidential elections that will take
place in DMR in December 2001. Then, they hope, Moscow will dispose of the
much-hated Smirnov and will support another person who will not be so
tainted by his relations with the criminal underworld. However, since
everybody – including OSCE and the Moldovan leadership – accepts Smirnov
as the legitimate representative of DMR interests, when Igor Smirnov is the
most consistent proponent of Moscow’s interests, it is very unlikely that the
Russian Federation will do so.
Another issue of interest is the Communist Party’s stance as to the DMR
problem and Voronin’s actions. It is obvious that lower-rank communists in
the Parliament are not aware of the current issues related to DMR and the
future of the Moldovan state. Time will probably give us an answer to this
question. Voronin is not likely to have problems with his own party, since he
is the most authoritative figure inside the Communist Party and, above all, the
communists believe that the collapse of the USSR was a crime and any
activities related to the restoration of the former USSR is noble and justified.
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